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Increasing international integration is going to make European welfare states somewhat more 
alike - no doubt about that. The intra-European integration is creating less different economic 
conditions between the countries. And the increasing economic interaction with Asia is 
putting pressure on them all to lower costs and/or go for high value-added export production. 
This paper argues, however, that increasing alikeness in a number of respects may not amount 
to convergence (i.e. the development of similar institutions), and that the different welfare 
states are going to retain their specific characteristics for quite a long time. The argument is 
based on a perception of societal convergence as a complex process, a characterization of the 
differences between welfare states as being deep-rooted differences of culture - and on a 
hypothesis that cultural change on such an aggregate level is a very slow process. 
 
 
1.  Welfare states under pressure 
 
 
Convergence may result from two kinds of pressures (Berger, 1996, p. 12): on the one hand, 
micro-institutional influences like new organizational patterns and life styles may undermine 
the wish to be nationally specific; on the other hand, macro-societal pressures like system 
competition or international policies may eliminate the ability to remain different.  
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The European welfare states are under pressure from both sides: the micro/meso structures 
and institutions of the labour market and individual reproduction are changing, generating 
new social risks and demands - the "new life cycle" (Esping-Andersen, ed., 1996). Working 
lives have become shorter and biological lives longer; stable employment is no longer a goal 
to be obtained for most of the labour force. 
 
And the macro structures and institutions of international markets and policy regimes are 
changing, creating new conditions for economic competitiveness and public policies (Pfaller 
e.a., eds. 1991). Increasing international trade has not been historically associated with 
immediate cuts in welfare state programs (Garrett & Mitchell, 1996), but with the present 
restrictive monetary policies of Western European states, triggered by EU agreements, the 
large spending on welfare state programs is coming under pressure. 
 
The two levels, the micro and the macro, are obviously connected, new production and 
communication technologies being essential parts of both - but nonetheless, together they put 
the democratic nation-state in a double squeeze: less able to act in combining social and 
economic policies, because it is loosing sovereignty and facing new global conditions, it has 
at the same time to address added challenges in the labour and social policy fields, following 
from the changing demands and forms of behavior in the labour markets. 
 
Both sides of the squeeze will act upon all welfare states - though not quite in the same way, 
nor in equal measure. As pointed out in Esping-Andersen (1996), the ways that different 
states currently respond to the challenges of new life cycles and new international conditions, 
are strongly conditioned by their peculiar arrangements. Different welfare state regimes lend 
themselves to different reactions to exogenous events. The question is: how much room is 
there for regimes to develop within their own identities? Will the different regimes disappear 
in favour of similar institutions? 
 
The "regime" perspective on welfare states leads to acceptance of diversity. And among 
welfare state researchers, it is the dominant perspective. Whether the existence of different 
regimes precludes a process of convergence, is not a given conclusion, however. The answer 
to that depends in part on the theorization of regimes. If differences are explained by 
"political economy" variables - variable levels of economic development, varying resources 
and positions for antagonistic groups and classes - convergence will follow from changes in 
such variables. As expressed by Graham Room: 
"when speaking of different models of welfare in different countries of the Community, it 
should of course be recognized that each of these models...is an accommodation or 
agreement between the competing social actors in the country concerned...But each of 
these accommodations of agreements is likely to be unstable, as external conditions 
change" (Room 1991, pp.10f.) 
 
"Political economy" has little trouble with change. But  when differences are seen as resulting 
from "institutional" variables, organizational and cultural features - then institutional change 
becomes a precondition for convergence. And institutional change involves the problems of 
breaking "institutionalized" patterns, changing the well-worn paths of development, 
confronting existing value patterns, etc. The theorization of institutional change is a complex 
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thing. 
 
Several empirical developments can be used as arguments for a hypothesis of convergence: 
the more intertwined international markets and powerful transnational companies may 
engender a common course of welfare state "dismantling" (Pierson, 1994), eventually through 
a transnationally active, "subversive liberalism" (Rhodes, 1995) or a general European "neo-
voluntarism" (Streeck, 1996). "Keynesian" welfare states of different persuasions may have to 
follow a common path towards becoming "Schumpeterian" ones (Jessop, 1994). The more 
generous systems, pressured by economic liberalization and declining fiscal capacities, may 
have to reduce themselves to the level of the least generous ones. Inside the European Union, 
an important sub-case of internationalization, a trend towards "welfare pluralism" may arrive, 
i.e. states mimicking each other's systems, in order to compete on the same footing 
(Abrahamson, 1992). 
 
My argument is rather the opposite: the different-ness of current welfare states shows that 
they have responded differently to earlier demands for adaptation. It is then to be expected 
that future results will also diverge - preserving, perhaps enhancing and probably 
restructuring diversity. What I try to explain, is the reason for divergence: why do similar 
changes in causal variables (like class structures, economic conditions, changes in 
international regimes) not produce similar outcomes? 
 
The state is central to any discussion of welfare states, but still there will be little agency in 
the argument. The states of Western Europe are both actors and arenas in the convergence 
process. They are the main actors in European integration and the main arenas for the 
struggles about social policy. They have lost much of their former powers through the 
integration process and other forms of globalization (Wallace 1995). But they must still 
produce the legitimacy needed for continued governance, through domestic social policies.  
 
Because of their centrality to democratic states, if welfare states were to convergence, it 
would be through a process of societal or system convergence. Partial convergences may 
occur in all sorts of sectors and areas, but social systems - societies - will only converge very 
slowly. The next section is on convergence theory, which - although being quite a dispersed 
body of theory - casts some light upon the general issue of convergence. 
 
The welfare states constitute the basic legitimating mechanism of modern democratic states. 
Through it, governments demonstrate their ability to satisfy the needs of citizens. If the 
welfare states fail, or are reduced severely, governments suffer the consequences. Section 3 
looks at the theories of welfare states, discussing theories about the sources of differences 
between welfare states.  
 
Section 4, then, argues for the crucial role of culture in creating and sustaining institutional 
differences. And finishes on a questioning note about the possibilities of cultural and 
institutional change - but with the certainty that cultures and institutions, especially large and 
complex ones, are very hard and slow to change. 
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2. Theories of convergence. 
 
 
Theories of convergence have become fashionable again after a longish break; earlier, they 
seem to have cropped up when social science observed radical differences among types of 
societies. Now, they are mostly treating rather narrow, technical subjects of differences 
between European macro economies. The question of classical convergence theory was: 
would these very different societies  (democracies vs. dictatorships; capitalist vs. communist) 
develop apart, or would they converge? Predictably, theories emphasizing historical 
trajectories or institutional theories would expect divergence; and theories about the abstract 
substratum of all human behaviour would predict convergence. 
 
The grand debates on "convergence" in the middle of the present century, started up with a 
number of social scientists suggesting that East and West would converge on a general model. 
Broadly spoken, two models were offered. On the one hand, free market theory - economic 
orthodoxy - would suggest that the price mechanism would cause societies to converge. On 
the other hand, theories about societal evolution would also argue for convergence: 
economics would suggest convergence based on the techniques and technologies of industry 
and industrialization; sociology would suggest that modernization would in the end make 
societies more alike.  
 
The orthodox economic model is quite simple: through the exchange of goods and the 
mechanism of competition, factor prices and thus living standards and levels of wealth will 
converge (Unger & Waarden 1995). If for a period there is too little exchange - the only thing 
that may hinder convergence - it is likely to increase through a rational choice of institutions 
(transaction cost approach; Williamson 1985) or through the political pressures brought to 
bear by citizens eyeing the opportunities that freer exchange provides for them (Austrian 
approach; Hayek 1960). In turn, the convergence of prices, wealth, and standards will make 
societies more alike. 
 
The "industrial society" or "modernization" approach was among economists developed by 
some of the analysts concerned with the capitalism/socialism distinction - economists like 
Burnham (1945), Sorokin (1944), Tinbergen (1961), and Galbraith (1967). Post-WWII, the 
developed world seemed to consist of two parts - a capitalist one, largely democratic, bound 
to satisfy the populations' demand - as expressed in voting - for material well-being. And a 
communist one, committed by its founding ideology towards the same goal. The competition 
between the systems obligated each not to fall behind the other. Now, to produce the same 
level of material well-being, societies would have to use the same production technologies. In 
accordance with standard economic thinking, technology was supposedly exogenously given 
for each level of productive efficiency. And, thinking materialistically, they concluded that 
converging technologies meant converging societies.  
 
Actors are not absent from economic theory - the economy is populated with rational actors. 
But in these analyses, political actors are blind. Nothing was less wanted by the governments 
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of the competing systems than convergence; however, these theories maintained, a set of 
general mechanisms would bring it about nonetheless. 
 
For sociologists, actors are not exactly blind; but their choices are governed by their culture-
ordained predispositions. Sociological convergence theorists saw it as springing from the 
process of modernization - a theory partly derived from the same technological 
determinism/industrial society reflections as in economics (Kerr 1983). Modernization theory 
predicted the same "modern" ways and forms of living to develop and spread among all 
societies, independent of their point of origin. Especially visible in political science, 
sociology may harbor a bias in favour of evolutionistic thinking. Under the guise of 
"comparative politics", what was offered was an evolutionary point of view, where countries 
would be ranked according to their accomplishments in producing the good, modern life: 
differentiation and secularization, for example (Aron, 1962; Almond & Powell 1966, Langlois 
e.a. eds., 1994).  
 
Seeing that real systems were intent upon not converging, a new generation of economists 
went to work dismantling the notions of convergence theory, developing a major literature 
about "comparative economic systems". They took seriously the institutional framework of 
the economy, and the political intent to compete rather than converge, and they studied the 
effects of different social and political systems on the performance of the economy. Different 
structures of ownership, of government and of management were thought to consist of two 
main models - a capitalist and a socialist one - as well as a few internal variations of the 
mains, and one or two mixed ones (for a textbook example, Gardner 1988).  
 
Just as "comparative economic systems" was becoming a major subdiscipline in economics, 
with its own textbooks, journals and symposia, (since 1990 there has been a European 
Association for Comparative Economic Studies)...one half of the comparison went missing, 
and if not convergence, then at least similarity or - perhaps better - hegemony (re)asserted 
itself in totally unforeseen, dramatic forms. The almost total failure to foresee what was to 
happen in Eastern Europe speaks caution to scientific ambitions, and the turns of the first 
convergence debate also warn about analytic dangers.  
 
For the study of economic systems, it has meant that the elaborately constructed typology of 
different systems shrank to a list of variations on one type. If not for Shonfield (1965), with 
the collapse of the Soviet empire, the idea of economic systems might well have disappeared 
from the agendas of the more influential economic schools. Shonfield's ideas underwent a 
gradual revival in the seventies, as the attempts at European integration showed distinct 
problems, and institutions proved themselves more recalcitrant to change than mainstream 
economic and idealist political theory had expected.  
 
The new comparativist research has to develop beyond the old "system" comparativism of 
pre-1989. But the task has become more difficult: what is a social system, if you cannot 
define it in contradistinction to a fundamentally different one? And, without the recalcitrance 
of institutionalized ideologies, what are the forces that keep societies different1? For a 
                     
    
1 Referring to a (West-) German - Polish comparison made at the Max Planck Institut in 
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materialistically inclined social scientist (be that marxist historical materialism or the 
orthodox economist's technological materialism), accepting societal differences caused by 
something as ephemeral as history and culture, is not easy. The different versions of 
"institutionalism" have attempted to answer that difficult question of the causes of diversity; 
but institutionalism is hardly a unified and well-established trend (Nielsen, 1988; recent 
overviews in political science are: Hall, 1994; Kato, 1996; Nørgård 1996).  
 
Basically, two paths of development have been open after the death of fundamental system 
comparison: a narrow one and a broader one. The "convergence debate" in relation to 
European integration is mainly about policy issues of a technical and narrow nature: the 
question of whether European economies, given the harmonization of some legal regulations, 
will converge in terms of a few, macro-economic, quantitative measures. A series of studies 
of "partial convergence" (convergence in single policy areas or economic sectors) 
demonstrate a number of possible mechanisms governing such convergence, and a number of 
different outcomes of efforts at harmonization (Unger & van Waarden, 1995). There has been 
very little serious research into the broader question of societal convergence or divergence in 
Europe (Dallago e.a. eds. 1991).  
 
The broader approach has attacked the whole complexity of finding the decisive societal 
differences between economies with clearly divergent developmental paths: in the spirit of 
Shonfield, and of Reinhardt Bendix and Barrington Moore, studies have been made on the 
difference between East and West. First it was Japan (Van Wolferen, 1993; Johnson, 1982), 
later, the "Tiger" economies of East Asia, and now China that have given rise to a growing 
literature (Whitley, (ed.) 1992; Wade 1990). In this debate, culture has been growing in 
prominence as an explanatory factor, although the concept of culture and its application in 
social science still is a tender area. 
 
Apart from regional studies, diversity has been analyzed in what has become the 
"governance" literature (or "comparative political economy" (Hall, 1995)).: different 
countries regulate their economies in different ways, and those ways have different effects on 
some measures of "performance" of firms, sectors, and national aggregates (Hollingsworth 
e.a., eds., 1994). The conclusions of the literature differ: some see the countries converging 
towards common levels of wealth and "best practices" in organization, others see a 
persistence of nationally specific models (Berger & Dore, 1996). Some societal models may 
outperform the others - in terms of political strength or economic competitiveness. Or there 
are functional equivalents - in the words of Whitley: "there are a plethora of forms of 
economic organization and production systems which appear to be effective in different 
contexts, and no obvious way of selecting the 'best' one" (Whitley, 1995).  
 
The new comparativism is divided on its conclusions about what to expect from the future in 
terms of convergence or divergence. But there is no doubt about the present importance of 
                                                                             
Berlin, Karl-Ulrich Mayer made the point that the most important differences between the two 
countries (creating different social and labour market structures) were not the "system" 
differences, but the historical differences in class structures and status systems (seminar at the 
Robert Schuman Centre, EUI, Firenze, Oct. 30, 1996). 
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national differences and divergent institutions. It will take both structural pressures and 
political agency to get from diversity to convergence, if it is to happen. 
 
These new comparativisms are generally situated somewhere between strictly causal 
analyzes, comparing outcomes as dependent variables on the background of independent 
variables of a mostly material nature (later in this paper to be called "political economy") - 
and more descriptive, narrative types of analysis covering a broad set of variables in complex 
interrelations. Sitting between these two methodological chairs of causality and narrativity is 
perhaps the general fate of institutionalists, and the prize to be paid for being sensitive to the 
differences that keep societies apart. 
 
The new comparativisms and institutionalisms do not prove that convergence does not take 
place. Rather, they prove the importance of institutional differences and the complexity of 
institutional change. When one set of institutions has to change because of political pressures 
or social or economic developments making it obsolescent, it may change into something 
different from institutions known in other countries - either into a functional equivalent of the 
foreign institution, or into a hybrid, nationally adapted form (Berger, 1996). 
 
Aggregate economic convergence in terms of average wealth and productivity levels seems to 
happen between countries at similar levels of development, but not between them and other 
groups (Boyer, 1996). Looking at the European sub-scene, the levels of living in European 
regions have converged in relative terms, but the distance between the rich and the poor 
remains as great as ever in absolute terms (Korpi, 1992). 
 
Social convergence is studied by Langlois e.a. (1994). Looking mainly at the USA, UK, 
Germany and Spain, and seeking commonalities in empirically defined "social trends", they 
do find a lot of similar, sectoral developments (sometimes labelled "partial convergence"2). 
This was to be expected, given the intense exchange of economic goods and services among 
these countries. But one important conclusion in the book is that these developments (such as 
more divorces, fewer children, post-industrial class- and labour market structures, etc.) do not 
make the societies in toto more alike. There is little "spill-over" from one societal field into 
another, and what there is, has unpredictable effects. The similar developments (partial 
convergences) are created by partly different circumstances and they have different effects, 
depending on the society in question. The same conclusion is drawn in a paper on the 
                     
    
2 some studies of convergence suggest diverse distinctions to be made in different types of 
convergence - like partial/total convergence (for sectorial/societal), or nominal/real economic 
convergence (in Unger & van Waarden, 1995; they have an interesting point about the European 
Union abstaining from nominal convergence, putting all the burdens on the real factors. The 
question, though, is whether economic factors are ever "real", i.e. physical, or just possess 
different degrees of "nominalness" - i.e., abstraction). 
Partial convergence, in the sense of sectoral similarities arriving, is most often trivial. But when 
looked upon in a broader context, it may be linked with the "classical" debate about societal or 
system convergence. Welfare state convergence is supposedly such a link in itself: the welfare 
state is too broad to be just a sector or a policy, and welfare state convergence is unthinkable 
without system convergence. 
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trajectories of the Two Germanies: a lot of partial and apparent convergence in different areas 
of the economy; but seemingly similar trends had different effects, and institutions with 
identical names had different functions in the Two Germanies (Brezinski, 1994)3.  
 
Cultural convergence - or one aspect of it, cf. the discussion in section 5 - has been briefly 
addressed by researchers from the European Values System Study Group (Ashford & 
Halman, 1994). They compare two opinion surveys from 1981 and 1990, covering a number 
of opinion or attitude dimensions and 9 EC countries - and find that "there is little evidence to 
support the view that the countries of Europe are moving towards greater consensus in their 
outlook" (p.84). 
 
The existence of the new comparativisms indicated the disappearance of some forms of 
convergence thinking:  "In sum, by the 1990s the idea that technology dictates a single 
optimal way of organizing production, thus propelling all countries towards common 
economic institutions and practices had largely vanished from the scene" (Berger 1996, p. 4). 
Especially the more ideologically flavoured convergence idea of the fifties, where some social 
scientists believed or hoped that the First and the Second Worlds could learn from each other, 
is nowhere to be found. But contrary to Berger, orthodox economics, which reduces all 
societal activity to instances of one ubiquitous behavioral logic, flourished in the 80s and still 
does. 
 
The Tinbergen paper on convergence (Tinbergen 1961) had a "vision" in the words of 
Heilbroner (1990, quoted in Roland, 1994): it expressed an inspired view of an important 
state of societal affairs. The convergence debate before and after it was also inspired by a 
view of desirable societal developments, however technocratic. Recent economic orthodoxy, 
operating with ideas about optimal economic arrangements on the system level, avoids such 
visions; negative social side-effects of supposedly rational economic policies are brushed 
aside as unavoidable costs of evolution, necessary sacrifices to be made. 
 
In this way, convergence thinking still reasserts itself, primarily in the neglect of institutional 
differences: a generally valid model and theory of society is assumed to exist, and in the long 
run there is no other possibility than to accommodate. And the convergence thinking of 
modern economics goes beyond theoretical orthodoxy - it actively downplays the negative 
effects of market creation.  
 
This is very clear in the situation of Eastern Europe. Social science had very little to offer 
towards an understanding of Eastern European possibilities after 1989 - proving how 
dependent social science is on established institutional arrangements. But this gave a free rein 
                     
    
3 The situation of the two Germanies in 1996 is a very interesting case of the relationship 
between social and cultural change: social change almost fully completed, now legal regulations 
and material standards of living are very close, or as close as they can be made politically, in the 
two G's. But cultures still differ, reflected in different behaviour in the political field, different 
micro-economic behaviour and different attitudes (for example reported in the IHT of Oct. 28, 
1996: the wessies being tired of feeding their brethren, and the Ossies missing stability and 
community).  
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to those theories that simply neglect the convergence problem, because they treat all societies 
as instances of the same behavioral laws. Orthodox economics believes that Eastern Europe 
will follow a  "J-curve": first they will suffer, production will fall, then growth will start and 
through the mobility of factors and/or goods, everybody will evolve towards being mature 
capitalist economies. Ceteris paribus, of course - meaning that a burden of suffering is being 
shouldered by a large part of the present population, while authorities wait for economic 
progress. 
 
In the European Union, standard economic theory also assumes that everybody will be better 
off in the end - specialized in whatever it is they are good at. Neglecting institutional 
differences means neglecting history: European states have developed very different societies, 
and an integration process that removes "barriers" to integration without erecting social 
protection, introduces catastrophic risks of social misery and societal disintegration (Scharpf, 
1996). Societies that expose themselves to international competition also expose some of their 
social and cultural values to the undermining influences of foreigners who do things 
differently. Some sort of protection or compensation is necessary, if social dissolution is to be 
avoided (Dore, 1996). 
 
The policy makers in Eastern European transition and European integration have not paid 
much heed to the insights from neocomparativists. Most policies are made and presented in 
the perspective of the One Best Way or the General Economic Logic. The common (now: 
single) market and the monetary union are presented as economic rationalities which take 
precedence over all sorts of political and social considerations. 
 
However, even in economic theory, arguments against the rationality of harmonization and 
integration exist: Free trade will only increase the wealth of some of the participants some of 
the time (Krugman, 1990; Streeten, 1996). And from an innovation perspective, diversity is 
good for the development of new ideas (Hingel, 1993). 
 
The treaty of European Union explicitly supports cultural diversity, national social policy 
autonomy and general policy subsidiarity. But at the same time, it removes their institutional 
protection, in the form of a national state committed to national arrangements and sometimes 
powerful enough to protect them. In the face of such removal of barriers, will cultural 
diversity persist? The welfare state may serve as an example of that discussion.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Convergence among Western European welfare states 
 
 
In the welfare state area, the national compromises and balances, around which the welfare 
states have been built, are crumbling: states are gradually and slowly loosing some of their 
powers, as competencies in industrial, monetary and fiscal policies are taken away from them. 
The ability of states to enter into "social contracts" with labour movements is withering away. 
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Some strong ideological tendencies are pointing towards convergence. In neo-liberal 
ideology, welfare states should be cut back in the name of economic efficiency. The acquired 
rights of social security members are privileges to be abolished, and the social service 
employees are bureaucrats to be dismissed. National institutions for social service and 
protection should be removed or privatized, in the name of the "level playing field" for 
companies. Those ideologies are quite powerful at the moment, pervading into intellectual 
and Social Democratic circles.  
 
Are the days of the historically developed welfare state regimes numbered, then? It is worth 
noting that the welfare state is an invention based on European societal systems; it has only 
ever existed in Western Europe and in those countries where immigrated Western Europeans 
have been dominant - North America, Australia and New Zealand. And yet, despite such 
strong common roots, the Western European states developed divergently - they grew 
different versions of the welfare state. Shortly after the Second World War, those versions 
were in place: the Beveridge model of liberal universalism, the Bismarck model of 
conservative corporatism, the Nordic model of social universalism, and the Catholic model of 
subsidiarity and residualism.  
 
About the time when the four models were being established and diversity thus confirmed, 
one may perhaps say that the movement towards European integration started. A common 
market developed slowly out of a system of 20 strongly separated national economies - and a 
process of slow and gradual harmonization of economic institutions started. The effects of 
economic harmonization on the welfare states, so far, have been small - mainly because 
economic harmonization has produced rather little economic convergence. Several economic 
factors were expected to affect the welfare state: 
 
- the enhanced factor mobility should produce a catching-up process in terms of economic 
wealth and levels of living; it should bring the needs of the different populations more 
in line and thus harmonize the levels of social spending and the demands for social 
protection. 
 
- the free movement of labour should even out differences in the labour market - in terms of 
education, employment, salaries, etc. Again, that should harmonize the demands for 
social services. 
 
- the harmonization of economic policies as part of the plan for an economic union should 
equalize the fiscal capacity of the state in supporting or running social schemes, and 
should abolish those industrial support schemes that were an alternative to social 
support for some countries. 
 
The factor freedoms and the harmonized institutions did not produce socio-economic 
convergence and enhanced mobility on the scale foreseen. Thus, the pressures on the welfare 
states have been less than expected. Some effects have been visible, however, in the social 
policy area (Leibfried & Pierson, 1995),  Despite protestations to the contrary, fragments of 
social policies were instituted on an EU level, as a necessary consequence of the 
harmonization of economic policies. But the effects in terms of equalizing social policies, or 
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converging welfare states, have been modest. 
 
Utilizing different comparative data sources, a number of researchers have looked at the 
Western European (Kosonen, 1994) or OECD (Järensjö Montanari, 1996) welfare states and 
investigated the degree of empirical convergence: how much did the social policies and social 
conditions of the relevant states approach each other in the decades after the Second World 
War? The findings are generally that looking at concrete social programmes as well as social 
conditions, they remain divergent: "evidence of harmonization is scarce among countries 
heading towards close economic integration" is the conclusion in Montanari's paper, a 
detailed study of three social programs in the OECD countries. Kosonen writes: "All in all, 
national welfare systems maintained their specific features from the 1960s to the 
1980s...convergence is not the only possible outcome of an integration process...the 
participating countries (and regions) may obtain divergent roles..." (p. 107) 
 
Gough and Eardley (1996), having investigated the social assistance programmes of the 
OECD countries, conclude that despite quite similar pressures, the effects on social assistance 
practices and schemes vary considerably, depending on the regimes already in existence. 
 
When discussing convergence between EU welfare states, we encounter the problem of 
agency: are we looking for "harmonization" of social policies - an active process to produce 
similarity. Or are we looking for an automatic, counter-intentional process of convergence? 
 
When the governments of the European Union try to bring convergence about in a number of 
separate sectors, it is harmonization or contrived convergence. They may succeed or not, may 
encounter resistance to change or go along smoothly. Whether to expect such resistance or not 
is an important subject for academic discussion, if it wants to enlighten policy processes. 
 
The governments do not try very hard in the social area; despite a social dimension being 
mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, social and labour market affairs have been relegated to the 
background of community developments. First, because macro economic policies were 
dominating the agenda, and member states were protecting their domestic turfs. After 1986, 
because micro policies of a neo-liberal nature were dominating, giving social aspects a bad 
name. But throughout, some welfare state convergence was not only sought, but also arriving 
as a result of policy efforts in other areas (Leibfried & Pierson, 1995, Ross 1995, and Rhodes 
1995). The study of European social policies in Leibfried & Pierson eds., 1995, can be taken 
as partial proof of a partial convergence theory (and of some elements of neo-functionalism as 
well):  
 
when states work hard at intensifying their market-economic relations and harmonizing the 
relevant institutions, some cooperation in other areas necessarily (i.e., despite political 
resistance) follows, meaning harmonization in other areas and thereby partial 
convergence, diminishing the differences among societal systems. 
 
Contrived convergence alias harmonization is an observation of policies: states are trying to 
become more alike. The conclusion from the convergence studies is that they do not succeed 
much, while the Leibfried and Pierson volume shows that they succeed to some modest 
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degree - but not as a direct effect of their strivings; besides contrivance, there is a mechanism 
involved. 
 
This leads to the other source of convergence: a convergence mechanism is assumed, 
producing outcomes that are different from (or wider than) policy intentions; outcomes caused 
by causes and effects unforeseen by policy makers. The convergence mechanism is our main 
concern here: will the globalization developments that are common to all the European 
welfare states bring about convergence, with or without the help of active efforts from the 
member states?. In this perspective, European integration is seen as one very acute version of 
a common globalizing trend. New international economic and political regimes that are 
influencing all societies are acutely felt in the EU, where the cooperation among states has a 
comparatively deep and binding nature. And socio-structural developments in the largest and 
strongest nations will immediately influence their partners, through new forms of 
competition, new economic opportunities and threats, new political and cultural trends. 
 
As pointed out in the Berger & Dore volume, convergence of economic institutions is 
probably impossible without political agency - and even then may be difficult or impossible 
to achieve (Berger 1996). So much more for the welfare state arena, which in a democratic 
state is intensely and inherently political. What we are looking for is therefore a mechanism 
that is sufficiently strong to force the political actors to comply, or alternatively a causal 
factor strong enough to cause definite resistance to a globalizing and harmonizing trend. 
 
To know more about such a mechanism, we have to know more about what drives the 
development of welfare states - why do welfare states arise, what makes a welfare state 
different from its past and its neighbours, etc. Once clarified on that, we may ask if 
globalization affects such mechanisms. Has globalization 
effects that go into these mechanisms, and if so, will the effect be convergence? The next 
question, then, is: what do we know about the mechanisms and forces that drive welfare state 
development? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Welfare state theories 
 
This is not the place for another compilation of welfare state theories, to be appropriately 
presented and criticized. That has been done by others at shorter or greater length (Esping-
Andersen, 1987; Pierson, 1991). Of interest here is specifically the causal question: which are 
the forces and mechanisms that shift welfare state developments in their direction and tempo? 
How are the causal interrelations between structural background developments such as world 
market forces, economic and class structures, and the institutions and programmes of the 
welfare state? And what role is played by the process factors - the decision mechanisms, the 
processes of organization and mobilization? Only if we have some knowledge of that, can we 
analyze the possibilities of convergence: are the common pressures of a sufficiently common 
and a sufficiently strong nature in order to produce convergence? 
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The overviews of welfare state theories can be said to produce a distinction between "political 
economy" theories and "regime" theories - with the latter being dominant in most recent 
research.  
 
Political economy theories (in the wide sense used here4) are the strictly causal ones that 
combine one or more independent variables of a political etc. nature with a dependent 
variable, having to do with the welfare state. The dependent variable will typically try to 
measure the benefits gained or foregone because of welfare state development in certain 
respects. It could be the benefits for some group, whose characteristics or resources would 
then constitute the independent variables. Or the dependent welfare state outcome variable 
could be some sort of common good or bad, like competitiveness or fiscal size of social 
policy, and then the independent variables would be more general - demographic or structural 
or whatever. 
 
Increasingly, following the Esping-Andersen and Korpi papers in the mid-eighties, 
researchers have turned to "regime" theories, recognizing that different welfare states can be 
ordered, in an ideal-typical fashion, into different "regimes" - complex combinations of a 
number of welfare state features. Sometimes regimes are thought to be structurally 
integrated: a number of related institutional characteristics of social and perhaps labour 
market programmes; and sometimes they are normatively integrated: clusters of ideological 
and policy features in the social and labour market (and health, housing, and education) areas. 
Regime theory is not always causal; whereas the pioneers in the eighties used regimes as their 
independent variable and societal outcomes as their dependent ones, they now see regimes 
more as a way of descriptively and heuristically ordering policy developments. 
 
Somewhere on the road from political economy to regime theory one enters the realm of 
institutionalism. Institutionalism is a contested concept, ranging from orthodox economic 
rationalism (where institutions are rationally chosen regularities) to classical sociology (where 
institutions are fundamental historical facts or hallowed social habits). Political economy can 
easily accommodate institutions as intervening variables between resources and outcomes. 
But somehow, using institutionalist theory implies that the strict causal connections between 
one set of variables and another are loosened: if, between the causes of working class 
structure and numbers and the effect of generosity of unemployment schemes, we insert the 
institution of corporatism - then the possibility of concluding directly from "reduced number 
of skilled workers" to "less generous programs" ...is weakened. 
 
Despite the dominance of institutionalism and regime theory, however, "political economy" 
                     
    
4 "Political economy" may mean something entirely broader - any theory about the relation 
between the political and economic spheres (Caporaso & Levine, 1992). Here, it is thought of as 
a methodological term, a (nomothetical) theory about the contested distribution of societal 
benefits among competing collective interests or purposes. The causality assumed may be 
intentional or functional. In contradistinction, other theories may analyze the same phenomena 
without presuming either interest, intention, or collectivity. And they may be idiographical. 
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reasoning is still important - because the establishment of causality is considered the hallmark 
of scientificness. And since the 1970ies, the comparative political economy of the welfare 
state has been a growth industry. The strongest efforts had to be spent on description, on 
making the different welfare states comparable at all: as policy constructs, they are at the 
outset all composed of idiosynchratic elements, defined by quaint legal terms understandable 
only in relation to specific national institutions. The first attempts at comparison were rather 
crude, measuring welfare state efforts as public social expenses and explaining them by other 
quantifiable variables, such as vote shares or age cohorts. But after the comparatively large 
research efforts orchestrated - among others - by Flora and Esping-Andersen at the EUI (Flora 
ed. 1986-87, Esping-Andersen 1990), Rainwater and others at the LIS (Smeeding e.a. eds., 
1990), sufficient comparability had been established to enable more theoretical analyses. A 
lot of those were of the political economy type.  
 
I will attempt, shortly, just to classify the "political economy" analyses into different 
methodological types, according to the explanations they seek and the causal mechanisms 
they apply. 
 
Firstly, the analyses differ in their explanatory perspective - 
whether they focus on  
 
structure:  the nature of the benefits sought,  
   the divisions among the competing groups 
 
or actors:  participating organizations  
   parties and ideologies 
   arenas and strategies 
 
 15 
 
Secondly, they differ in their application of causal mechanisms which can be either 
 
economic:  competitiveness, fiscal problems 
 
or political: power, resources, positions. 
 
Figure 1 - the political economy of welfare state policies: 
EXPLANATORY  
PERSPECTIVES 
ECONOMIC         POLITICAL 
STRUCTURE  
 
 
     
1. Macro:  Fiscal 
          policy; 
   Micro: 
       Allocation 
              and 
     distribution 
3. Class 
   interests; 
   Party programs 
ACTION: 
      
2. Market 
   distortions; 
   Incentive 
   structures 
4. Voting; 
   Government  
 
From an economic perspective, 1: the development of welfare states has been explained as an 
attempt at manipulating public expenditure - fiscal policies in the Keynesian mould. Large 
transfers and masses of public employees were seen as demand enhancement measures. As a 
matter of historical record, these explanations are probably too post-hoc to be true: policies 
have been made as responses to political pressures, not as implementations of economic 
theory. The same goes for the explanation of the welfare state as an allocation measure. 
 
In the next box, 2: from an action (or perhaps better: process) perspective the welfare state 
has been viewed as an effect of the existence of incomplete market mechanisms. When 
markets are not allowed to clear, market failures arise, and the state has to fill the gaps (Barr, 
1992). If income groups are rational actors, moreover, they can use the institutions of the 
welfare state: groups with less than full success in the marketplace have an incentive to 
demand redistributive measures from the state.  
 
From a political perspective, 3: the welfare state has been seen as a product of social structure 
- a victory of working-class interests, a compromise between workers and peasants/farmers, 
or a political construction made by the ruling class to pacify workers (Esping-Andersen 1985, 
Gough 1979, Piven & Cloward 1972). It has also been seen as an implementation of party 
programs of the Social Democrats or Labour parties.  
 
From a political action or process perspective, 4: it can be viewed as an effect of 
democratization and the mass vote: given the vote, it may be easier for workers to get 
concessions through control of the parliament than winning wage rises in the labour market. 
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Or the governmental process may induce governments to grant concessions to win votes in 
order to remain in power, or conserve social order (Anderson, 1995) . 
 
The political economy theories have one thing in common: a clear concept of causality. The 
objects of analysis are something that is causing something else, and the analytical interest 
focusses on the mechanism (nature, strength and direction) of causation. Political economy 
also has another virtue or two: it lends itself to scientific progress in terms of quantification 
and cumulation. Most of the variables that enter the PE models can be abstracted sufficiently 
to be quantified. And working with variables they have in common with economics and 
political science, they can take advantage of - as well as occasionally contribute to - both the 
theoretical development in such established disciplines of "normal science", and official 
statistics. 
 
The problem of political economy in the welfare state field is the complexity of variables. To 
calculate correlations on such macro variables as class structures and welfare state generosity, 
will often entail working with very few, very abstract variables meant to represent a rich and 
complex reality. In this way, even sophisticated political economy removes itself quite far 
from historical "reality" as it represents itself to participants in policy-making, and from the 
complexity of social problems, with all their existential and operational contexts5. 
 
Addressing complex developments invites a more narrative or descriptive approach. 
Institutionalism is a step in that direction. In institutionalist analyses, the growth of the 
welfare state and the character it has assumed, are related to the development of state and 
societal institutions - like the governmental system, the parliamentary system, the business 
system, the family institution, the church, etc. In such analyzes, the roles of interests and of 
economic incentives, etc. are retained, but supplemented with the mediating or formative role 
of institutions. 
 
The complexity achieved by inserting institutions in an otherwise political-economy/causal 
perspective is daunting: the levels of analysis multiply, and the possible causal connections 
likewise. In a number of cases that has led to studies using a traditional historical method, 
where there is no attempt to locate causality in specific, perhaps measurable, variables. The 
analysis turns into an idiographic mould, a narrative where theories and causal reflections are 
mobilized when thought fit to explain particular parts of the story, but not allowed to structure 
the narration (Ashford 1986, Seip 1981, Kuhnle 1983).  
 
In other studies, measurable or even quantifiable indicators for institutional variables have 
been suggested (Esping-Andersen 1990). In such work, the broad abstraction of the concepts 
does not really match the specific concretion of empirical measures. 
 
Institutionalism effectively adds the causality of form to the material causality implied in 
political economy: the trajectories followed, the interrelations established, and the forms of 
                     
    
5 The complexity can be gauged from the extraordinarily broad range of perspectives on the 
welfare state covered in Pierson (1993), as well as the existential and practical perspectives 
addressed in the social administration literature. 
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behaviour developed into legitimate routines (i. e., institutions) are seen as important 
codeterminants, shaping the choices otherwise caused by political and economic forces. Upon 
that, there is near-unanimity among people labelling themselves institutionalists in the 
different social science disciplines. But that is not very far: the question of "co-determination" 
is very difficult, the relative role of different causes - can they be weighed against each other, 
or must we speak about different forms of causality? If we leave the rigorous causal thinking 
of political economy, which forms of causality do we then imagine? Will we be leaving 
"external" causality and entering "internal" causality (Østerberg, 1987)? What are the 
methodological implications of such a shift? 
 
The classical solution, the Weberian one, in most institutional analyses has been the analysis 
of typologies. Typological analysis is a way of grouping characteristics that are seen as 
usually occurring together, or as logically leading to each other, into clusters that are given 
some theoretical status6. 
 
These clusters - ideal types - can then be used either as dependent variables (types, whose 
logic and emergence have to be explained) or as independent variables (types that cause 
societal effects in some areas). There is no necessity of either, and often there is no clear 
causality in typology analysis, neither are the empirical or theoretical relations between the 
clustered elements always clearly established: Weber's method was based on some historical 
analysis and a great deal of "logical intuition". 
 
In welfare state theory, typology analysis has become regime theory. It starts with Titmuss's 
distinction between universal, residual and industrial-occupational welfare states (Titmuss, 
1974). His scheme, based on programme characteristics of social policies, has been widely 
used, lately very much during the interpretation Esping-Andersen made of it. Esping-
Andersen, however, besides pursuing more methodologically precise studies of the 
correlation between form and effect, extends the definition of the types: on to structural 
integration he adds normative integration. To each cluster of programme characteristics there 
is a political philosophy compatible with it. The industrial-occupational type, thus, is not only 
a certain way of deciding the rights of recipients - but also an expression of a corporatist and 
conservative political ideology. It correlates with an inclination to give trade unions a large 
role in society, and to preserve, through welfare state mechanisms, the inequalities created by 
the market. 
 
In GE-A's 1990 studies of the correlations between welfare state types and distributional 
outcomes, typological analysis is used to structure the interaction between societal variables 
and social outcomes. The papers demonstrate correlations between for example welfare state 
types and the distributional impact of pension systems. To reach these outcomes means using 
the latest in internationally compatible distribution figures and several quantitative indices on 
welfare state types. 
                     
    
6 When naming his ideal types, Weber choose historical names, thereby sometimes 
confusing descriptive with ideal-type analysis. But he gained something else: the contextual and 
value implications of the form. Later sociologist's attempts to be value free led to the creation of 
funny neologisms for their theoretical constructions - with few lasting effects. 
 18 
 
 
In those studies, however, the insertion of regime analysis in political economy models may 
be meeting its limit. Some correlations are at high probability levels and their implications 
interesting, but overall, the variables treated are of such high levels of generalization and 
complexity, that the exact nature of the results found may be difficult to gauge. 
Correspondingly, it seems that some of the later studies done, though frequently quoting the 
typologies, are using them less as structuring devices in causal analysis, and more as 
heuristical tools: they are not seen as exact clusters of elements, whose relations are to be 
studied carefully; instead, they are broad indications of directions, in which one may look for 
possible causes and correlations.  
 
That is certainly the tendency in Esping-Andersen's recent edited volume (1996). The units of 
analysis in that volume are single states or, more often, small clusters of states with much 
more in common than the formal features of their welfare systems, but also with significant 
differences that make strict causal analysis difficult. The interest is broadened from social 
policies to the interaction of several policy fields, including especially labour market and 
economic policies. And the descriptive and explanatory factors sought include a broad range 
of micro and macro variables, more or less chosen ad hoc to fit the particular context.  
 
 
 
 
 
5. A cultural factor? 
 
 
This section is a discussion of the usefulness of "culture" as an explanatory factor in welfare 
state theory. Culture is probably the factor behind regime differences, but also a difficult 
object of analysis, difficult to integrate into a social science problematic. 
 
To sum up the argument so far: EU welfare states have not converged much, despite great 
economic and social pressures upon them, and some policy efforts to harmonize them. One 
group of theories essentially suggest that the development of welfare states is governed by 
"political economy" factors - i.e., that they will change with changes in structures and 
processes in the political and economic systems. But although these changes are rather alike 
for the welfare states, they seem not to have converged as a result. Another group of theories 
suggests the existence of different regimes, responding differently to developments in the 
environment. But these regime theories are not very precise as to what are the causal factors 
involved, and thus unable to predict convergence or divergence in the future. 
 
Thus we have two reasons for introducing culture as a factor in the explanations: first, the root 
causes of welfare state divergence are not established yet - one group of theories does not 
recognize divergence, the other does not explain it. Secondly, I want to suggest that the 
difference between regimes may be insufficiently characterized in the political economy 
mode - as balances of interests and resources. The cause of the existence of different regimes 
may be better expressed as the existence of different cultures. 
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In a common sense meaning of the words, political and economic factors are strong causes for 
all sorts of societal developments; it is impossible to deny, for example, that the general level 
of economic wealth is crucial in determining the possible level of social services. And the 
balance of political forces determines the current tendencies in social spending. But the 
workings of economic and political developments on the welfare state filter through a thicket 
of institutions, making it generally impossible to determine a direct cause-and-effect 
relationship between precisely defined political economy developments and welfare state 
shifts. 
 
On a methodologically more precise level, it is probably more true to say that social science 
cannot imagine societal developments that are not caused by political and economic factors; 
that is the way we look at the world. The whole scientific establishment in social science is 
built around the analysis of political and economic "factors" - with the more thoughtful types 
constantly adding ideological and organizational factors (Hall, 1993; Mann, 1993). But 
seemingly each generation has to add those anew; politics and economics remain central. 
 
The introduction of other factors than the political and economic ones has had different names 
- but the idea has always been to try to include the way in which past patterns of behaviour 
and thought influence the possible ways of behaving and thinking - through the similar 
patterning of individual minds or the binding nature of collective arrangements. It has been 
called path-dependency, history, culture, ideology or institutions. The most forceful versions 
have been historical analyses of major developments - like the destinies of working class 
movements in Western Europe: the size of the working class in Western capitalist societies 
varies rather little. What creates the large differences in its relative influence from country to 
country, is mainly the way it is organized, and the way its organizations are situated in the 
general institutional configuration of the state (Rokkan 1970; Korpi 1983; Mann 1993).  
 
In Michael Mann's major opus about the "souorces of social power" (1993), where he actually 
studies sources of societal change, he operates with economic and political sources - and adds 
ideology and military ones. My suggestion would be, that those added variables are expressed 
on a too low level of abstraction - actually incomparable with the other terms in the four-fold, 
"political" (although he does give it a limiting definition) and "economic". The military 
dimension is quite a technical one - narrowly connected with the exercise of power, which is 
the specific subject of Mann's volumes. But the ideological one would be better termed 
"culture", at least if it was to be used in a broader context, not so tightly connected with the 
issue of power. 
 
The second reason for introducing a "culture" variable could be to clarify what institutions 
and regimes are really about. Institutionalism, as already mentioned, means introducing the 
importance of form into the materialistically inclined causality of "political economy". That 
has been suggested in several contexts (Offe, 1984; De Swaan, 1988; March & Olsen, 1989), 
and one could say that Organization Theory, a major business school discipline, is about little 
else than the importance of form for social processes.  
 
Where the concept of "form" becomes "culture", is where it is not analyzed as a (rational) 
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choice of optimal rules of behaviour, but as a qualitatively distinct element: a form that is pre-
given through the perceptions of participants or through the binding nature of collective 
arrangements, and that has effects of a different kind on the societal process than the effects 
of ordinary political economy variables like resources, interests and incentives, etc. 
 
If institutions and regimes are more than rationally chosen sets of rules - if they are complex, 
historically given entities that frame the social processes and can only be changed by them in 
the longer run - then the novelty of institutionalism is culture. 
 
At this point, attempting a definition of culture becomes necessary. It is a very difficult task - 
culture is one of these essentially contested concepts (like "politics" and "democracy" 
Connolly, 1983) that invite controversy as part of their very function. Most treatments of the 
concept make do with discussions of its uses in various scientific disciplines (often leaving 
out the humanities) or some internal cleavages in the field of culture (high/low, etc.). One 
possible definition is that 
 culture = collectively held meaning 
 
The next step would be to specify what "meaning" means for societal analysis. One could 
venture the following three points, between them operationalizing the definition of culture:  
- values, i.e. things that actors value, be they material or immaterial 
- understandings, the interpretations given to things by actors 
- habits, the behavioral regularities routinely followed by actors. 
 
Culture is not just about notions in the consciousness of individual - even if those notions are 
meaningful to their bearers, and common to a lot of bearers. It is also about collective 
arrangements which are perceived as binding, by those individuals. That aspect should be 
covered by the "collectively held" term above - implying those words are to be understood in 
a broad fashion. 
 
When applying cultural concepts to societal analysis, we are most often interested in national 
cultures, where the chances of consistency of meanings across the whole "group" are not great 
(Smelser, 1992). In those cases, we have to make do with meanings that are "collectively 
held" only in the sense of being dominant or widespread or politically significant. 
 
The three concepts do not exhaust the possibilities of subdividing the broad concept of culture 
or meaning. They are pointers in the direction of cultural analysis, and should improve 
somewhat on the usually underdefined concept of culture - often used as a catch-all or 
unspecified filler in analytical crevices. Neither do the suggested definition and the three  
operationalizing concepts solve the methodological problem of how to study culture - if 
culture is something different from action or structure, which I believe it has to be, to be 
useful. 
 
The methodological implications of applying cultural analysis point in the direction of the 
"softer" methods of sociology: in-depth interviews, historical background analysis, discourse 
analysis, etc. - if not into the directly humanistic methods of interpretation and text analysis. 
But as is well known, the textually oriented methods, being individualistic in their 
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perspective, have problems when the aim is to produce causal and generalizable theories on 
the societal level.  
 
Traditional sociology was never foreign to cultural factors; to Parsons, they were an integral 
part of his methodological reflections. Modern sociology and organization theory make 
diligent use of the studies of values and habits. But the methods of Parsonian sociology 
carefully avoid the question of meaning. For Weber, meaning was important to the method of 
Verstehen. For Parsons, consciousness is reduced to a status as behavioral dispositions - much 
like Hofstede's idea of culture as a "mental programme": something the researcher may 
discern in his human objects, as different from something the researcher has to substantially 
understand. 
 
The Parsonian approach points to methods of behavioral analysis in analyzing culture: 
cultural factors are measured in terms of expressed attitudes or performed behaviour. Such 
methods have been used for welfare state analysis in several cases, and we have seen studies 
either of attitudes directly towards the welfare state, or attitudes relevant to the welfare state 
(for example, Svallfors, 1993; Kangas e.a. 1995). Attitudes can be used as independent 
variables, to be correlated with features of the welfare state, whose existence or persistence 
one wishes to explain. But behavioral methods are not occupied with meaning, with the 
contents and interrelations of attitudes and of attitudes and institutions. 
 
The alternative to behavioral methods are hermeneutic methods, which look at the 
understandings of actors involved, interpret statements, behavior and signals to get at the 
meanings expressed in those. From a hermeneutic perspective one would analyze the relations 
between meanings and contexts such as institutions, structures, and behaviour. In the welfare 
state area: a specific type of welfare regime is a result of the interpretation given to social 
problems and possible solutions by the involved actors and decision-makers. Because 
participants understand problems and solutions in a certain way, attach specific evaluations to 
them, and habitually act upon them in a given fashion, one form is generally preferred to other 
forms.  
 
To apply cultural categories means to change somewhat the methodology of welfare state 
analysis - to use more hermeneutic methods. It also means that some new perspectives may be 
brought in - or some perspectives may be emphasized more. Beside the "political economy" 
variables of interests, resources, and incentives - also situational aspects, historical 
trajectories, the influences of concepts and values, will be emphasized. Cultural analysis 
means that we are interested in how the actors understand the situation and their actions, 
where they got their understandings from, and whether they are likely to act upon or to 
change these understandings. We also want to know which aspect of a situation the actors 
value, with whom they share their values and how they rank different aspects in relation to 
each other. And we want to know which routines exist in relevant areas, where they stem 
from, and what meanings and values are attached to them.  
 
Introducing culture is a progress in terms of realism, complexity and power of explanation. It 
adds details and colour to description (cf. Geertz's "thick description" as the definition of 
cultural analysis - 1973), and avoids the blind spots in causal analysis where simple 
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correlations are covering for complex interrelations. But the crucial problem lies on the 
border between nomothetical and idiographical analysis, between causality and narrative: 
with cultural factors included, can we still retain a right to generalize findings and to draw 
causal conclusions? Let us try a few arguments as pertaining to the welfare state. 
 
Culture is definitely an important factor in welfare state developments: both values, meanings 
and habits are important elements in determining the choices of welfare state programs. If we 
initially accept a definition of culture as consisting of those three elements, we can line up a 
number of evidences to support this proposition: 
 
Values  - the willingness to share the nation's economic resources, and the willingness to pay 
for a large public sector are essential attitudes to take into account for policy makers. They 
vary widely from nation to nation, as attitude surveys demonstrate. Preferences for public 
versus private solutions, for family versus individual responsibility, are also different, and 
correlate sharply with welfare state types.  
 
Meanings - the understanding of the causes of social need, meanings associated with the 
words like "unemployment", "responsibility" and with institutions like the state, the family 
and trade unions; these meanings differ between nations, and are important parts of the 
discourse in which welfare state issues are debated and understood. 
 
Habits - the inclination to join collective organizations and to take part in public life in 
political parties and elections, traditions for support in and outside families, for establishing 
businesses, for hiring and firing employees; such habitual patterns of behaviour determine the 
structure of needs that arise and must be covered by the welfare state. 
 
A hypothetical example: the relation between catholicism and residualism. A behavioralist 
analysis would require the development of some form of index of catholicism (prevalence of 
catholic church, number of churchgoers, attitude surveys of declared faith, behavioral indices 
of faith) - and an index of residualism (high proportion of means-testing among benefits, low 
levels of transfer incomes). Then the two indices would be correlated, and the result would be 
assumed to show a causal relationship: cultures dominated by catholicism tend (or perhaps: 
tend not) to produce residualist features in the welfare state.  
 
A hermeneutic analysis of the same relation would investigate the discourse around welfare 
state policies, and interrogate participants about their motives and the causes of their actions. 
Which values were felt relevant by participants, which meanings did the problems and 
possible solutions convey, how could the role of habit and tradition be seen in the process? 
Did family morality, subsidiarity, respect for authority, belief in divine providence, the 
conception of society as a network of families... play a role in deciding action? The answers 
found would be used to produce a "thick description" (Geertz, 1973) of the process under 
investigation, and the researcher would suggest an interpetration of the process, where some 
factors would be accorded more weight than others. 
 
Both forms of cultural analysis have their problems. The "behavioralist" produces results that 
are generalizable; if the indices of catholicism and residualism covary, then some sort of 
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general relation, expected to hold true for more than a few instances, can be postulated with a 
certain plausibility. But at the same time it represents little progress in relation to ordinary 
materialistic, political economy reasoning: the cultural variables must be abstracted to 
function in behavioralist analysis. One can still only treat one factor at the time and only 
group them together in clusters and (ideal) types. Causality is there, but mostly as correlation, 
interpreted as causality through theoretical reasoning, but far from proven in the analysis. 
 
The "hermeneutic" form establishes causality in a much more satisfying way - at the cost of 
generality. If participants express their motives to act, and their perceptions of options in a 
way that supports our hypothesis of a relation between X and Y, and behavioral data do not 
contradict it, then no stronger notion of causality is possible to establish in the field of human 
behaviour. Parsons, too, felt the need for an interpretation of motives to supplement the more 
structural data, to be sure causality was really located, including both structural and 
motivational elements (Parsons, 1951; Alexander & Seidman, 1990). But as the level of 
personal feeling and thinking is brought into the picture, generality naturally disappears.  
 
If, for example, we must, in order to understand the development of the Danish welfare state, 
include both behavioral and materialistic variables like class interests and economic 
structures, the institutions of the state and the labour market, behavioralist cultural elements 
like attitudes and preferences, and hermeneutic elements like the perceptions of actors and 
decision-makers, etc.... then we shall have a good understanding of the formation of the 
Danish welfare state, but perhaps not be able to use it for much in the understanding of other 
welfare states or future developments in the Danish one: what held true in a certain 
combination of structure, conjuncture and actor configuration, does not necessarily enlighten 
the understanding of other combinations. 
 
One important area where behavioral and hermeneutic thinking differ, is in the conception of 
social change. To imagine social change from a behavioral point of view is easy - it is just a 
question of imagining different values on some of the independent variables. Imagining social 
change in the hermeneutic perspective is not different as such; but the direction of change will 
be difficult to establish, given the unlimited complexity of causality. 
 
If we want to assess the possibilities of welfare state convergence in Europe, cultural factors 
add to the complexity of analysis, but their importance is difficult to assess.  
The gulf between ceteris paribus and thick description remains. 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
Welfare states are complex important policy clusters and political arenas, that show specific 
national characteristics in different states. They are squeezed by post-industrial social 
structures and globalizing societies, but so far they do not converge to any large degree. The 
factors that keep them different are to a large degree institutional or cultural factors, and they 
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will only converge if those factors change, allowing for convergence. Analyzing such cultural 
factors, however, is a difficult task and poses specific methodological problems. 
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